lentils

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Buddhavacana. In the beginning was the word. And the word begat the phrase. And the phrase begat the sentence; the sentence, the paragraph; the paragraph, the work; the work, the collection; the collection, the canon; the canon: The Teachings of the Buddha. Teachings upon teachings upon teachings. Teachings trudging through time and hurtling through space—throughout India, Asia, Europe and North America, mingling always with local cultures and customs and worldviews. A vast corpus of words, out of which are spun our diverse contemporary expressions, verbal and written—all proclaiming the word (vacana) of the awakened one (buddha).

Dizzy? Come, I will prepare you some lentils.

Buddhism is booming in North America. The number of American adults self-identifying as “Buddhist” has risen from barely 400,000 in 1990 to over a million today (Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey, Summary Report, 2009, page 5). The influence of Buddhist teachings on our society, however, extends well beyond that figure. From medicine to physics, from philosophy to ecology, from Washington to Hollywood Buddhist ideas, images, and figures are becoming commonplace. Yoga, mindfulness, karma, nirvana, Buddha, enlightenment, flow, interdependence, no-self, Dalai Lama, meditation, emptiness, Zen,“it’s all good”—sound familiar? bring anything to mind?

Let’s slow down. Slowing down, in fact, is a good way to summarize what this blog is about.

The purpose of this blog is to encourage the slow imbibing of the very words that make up Buddhist teaching. I assume that you, the reader, have begun to accommodate these teachings into your life, and that you have discovered that “Buddhist teaching” is much too much to swallow whole. Perhaps, like me, you are finding that trying to do so causes bloating. If so, I offer you a simple antidote: let us savor, together, each word.

Reading at the level of the word, as I am suggesting here, is called “philology.” I first learned to read in this manner as a student of Sanskrit and Pali in Göttingen, Germany. But this is not a philology book. I do hope, nonetheless, that you will come to value the philologist’s concern for the word in and of itself. What is the value of such concern? Well, in the beginning, in the first instance, there always stands the single word. We want to know it: what are its parts (prefixes, roots, etc.)? what do they signify? what metaphors are swirling therein? what part of speech is it? what might its history tell us? what does it want from us? All of this takes time. And it will take a long time before we reach ”Buddhist teaching.” This is a race of the slow. To set the pace, I invite you to consider these words of a famous German philologist. (I’ve changed some words to better fit our case.)

A blog like this, a problem like this, is in no hurry; we both, I just as much as my blog, are friends of lento. It is not for nothing that I have been a philologist, perhaps I am a philologist still, that is to say, A TEACHER OF SLOW READING—in the end I also write slowly. Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also to my taste—a malicious taste, perhaps?—no longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair every sort of person who is ‘in a hurry.’ For philology is that venerable art which demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become still, to become slow—it is a goldsmith’s art and connoisseurship of the WORD which has nothing but delicate, cautious work to do and achieves nothing if it does not achieve it lento. But precisely for this reason it is more necessary than ever today, by precisely this means does it entice and enchant us the most, in the midst of an age of ‘work,’ that is to say, of hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste, which wants to ‘get everything done’ at once, including every old or new book—this art does not so easily get anything done, it teaches to read WELL, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and after, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers … My patient friends, this book desires for itself only perfect readers and philologists: LEARN to read me well! (Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröthe, 1881. Translation: R. J. Hollingdale, Daybreak [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], p. 5.)

So, please, have a sit. Relax. The lentils are almost ready.

gotama/the buddha

Prelude.

Gotama is Socrates, an opaque enigma; he is Thoreau.

The Buddha is Us, as transparent as a Hollywood star; he is People.

Gotama is a man whose life we have barely begun to imagine or investigate.

The Buddha is a literary figure imagined and fashioned by anonymous compilers of the canonical literature over two millennia ago, and embraced by countless faithful ever since.

Gotama wraps himself in cloth collected from a dung heap or cremation ground. He stinks. He is earthy, precise, specific, adamant.

The Buddha fancies tiaras and golden robes. He exudes the fragrance of sandalwood and lotus. He is cosmically complex.

Explanation.

Why do I call him “Gotama” (or, in Sanskrit, “Gotama”) rather than “the Buddha.” The short answer is that I agree with Ralph Waldo Emerson that our life-guides “must be related to us, and our life receive from [them] some promise of explanation.” Gotama fulfills this basic requirement. The Buddha does not.

I have given up on the Buddha. That is to say, I have given up on the Enlightened One, the Blessed One, the omniscient Lord of people and gods who works miracles, knows unknowable things, and continues to exert his power from beyond. When I ask Buddhists to explain why I should accept their revered sage as a modern-day life-adviser, I am typically offered only articles of faith (claims to be believed in or rejected) and rarely good (that is, examinable and testable) reasons.

I imagine that some readers are like me in this regard: we have been inoculated from the religious bug. We are no longer willing, or indeed even able, to acquiesce to the inscrutable sureness of the religious authorities’ advice concerning the most important matters of life and death. Like the Kalamas in ancient India, living at a crossroads of competing religious-philosophic commerce, we have eyes only for what lies in full view. And what lies in view is the merit of a claim, not its sacred origins in some cosmic or cognitive transcendence, such as “enlightenment.”

But along the way, something unexpected happened. I met one of the world’s most gifted teachers. He is Gotama, the human figure behind the fanciful facade of the Buddha. Like the Stoics, Epicureans, and Platonists in ancient Greece and Rome, Gotama instructed in the manner of a philosopher, a lover of wisdom. He taught and modeled a viable way to human flourishing, and did so rooted firmly in everyday life. With precision, care, and intelligence, Gotama articulated for us the categories and practices through which we may clearly understand our lives and, doing so, know for ourselves the simple happiness of existing, in difficult as well as trouble-free times. And all of his advice on these matters stands in full view—conspicuous, open to scrutiny, testable.

dukkha: unease

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dukkha. The most common rendering of the Pāli term dukkha, is “suffering.” So, if you have read books on Buddhism before, you have almost certainly encountered the term “suffering” where I have “unease.” However, probably very few people would characterize their lives as being characterized by suffering. The notion of pain and anguish connoted by that term does indeed resonate in dukkha; but it is too drastic for a general and universal application. So, the stock statement life is suffering, while not outright incorrect, is somewhat too drama-queenish. In getting a better feeling for the meaning of dukkha, let’s place “suffering” at one extreme end of the dukkha spectrum. At the other extreme end, let’s place qualities such as “annoyance, tension, non-dependability.” So far then, dukkha can be understood on one end of the spectrum as a subtle, perhaps barely discernible quality of being, and, on the other, as severe mental or physical anguish.

A further nuance is added to the term dukkha when we bear in mind that, in the Buddha’s view, even a “happy” moment is tinged by dukkha. That is because neither the moment nor the experience is stable. Since the quality of happiness arises in dependence on external factors, it fades away as those factors disassemble. And therein, in that gap, is felt the trace, however subtle, of underlying dukkha. Since, furthermore, our lives are a succession of such moments, dukkha is said to be “pervasive.” But Buddhists would go even further, to the point of what appears paradoxical, even contradictory: it is not only in the gap (due to impermanence and insubstantiality) that dukkha is present, but even in the very experience of happiness.

So, given this view, what should we call dukkha in our language?  Our English term would have to have the following colorings (on an increasing scale of intensity):

faint unsettledness

irritation

impatience

annoyance

frustration

disappointment

dissatisfaction

aggravation

tension

stress

anxiety

distress

exasperation

vexation

pain

desperation

sorrow

sadness

suffering

misery

agony

anguish

(You may add to this list; there is virtually no end to it. And that is precisely the Buddha’s point! It flows through life like water—each instance of life is colored to some degree by one of these qualities.)

Now, I think that it is obvious that each of these qualities involves some degree of unease; so, “unease” is how I translate the term for general usage. The lexical “opposite” of dukkha is sukha; and sukha straightforwardly means “ease, pleasure, happiness.” Perhaps, then, dukkha can be taken to mean straightforwardly “unease, displeasure, unhappiness.” We all know about dukkha, then, as it is glossed by the Buddha here.

(First published in Shambhala Sun, May 2008)

khandha: existential functions

stove

khandha. “The five components of grasping” is the Buddha’s shorthand for what we commonly refer to as “person, self, identity, soul.” The Buddha said that he looked everywhere in vain for the kind of stable, integral entity that is implied by such terms. You, too, can look. But where will you look? In your nose? ears? chest cavity? stomach? Perhaps your self can be found in your memories, thoughts, sense of identity. The more we “look,” the more absurd appears the commonly held notion of my being (having?) a self. For the Buddha, this persistent sense that I have of being a “person” is the result of erroneously imputing an object where there is really only process. This process, moreover, is perceptual in nature, having to do, as it does, with human being. Although this process, like any other, is a seamless flow devoid of stops, it can, on analysis, be said to have innumerable aspects. The Buddha called these aspects khandha, meaning “clusters,” “clumps,” or “aggregates,” and found it beneficial to identify five of them as possessing particular importance. These five are: materiality, feeling, perception, conceptual fabrication, and cognizance. To get a view on this five-fold process of being, it might be useful to try an experiment. First of all, read the following explanation of the five components (a). This will give you some theoretical grounding in the process to which these five point. Then analyze a perceptual act in terms of the components (b). This exercise should give you some practical insight into the process. Finally, consider the Buddha’s pithy remarks concerning the fundamental nature of this process (c).

(a)        1. Materiality (rūpa) is the “givenness” of matter, which consists of the four elements: earth (solidity), water (coherence), fire (energy), and wind (distention). In terms of the “person,” rūpa is the body. Note that the Buddha is not concerned with the origin or end of the material world. The world just is — when you open your eyes, there it is. You must deal with it just as it is, regardless of how it came to be and how it might cease to be. Hence, the first instance that the Buddha marks out as a khandha is this primary givenness of the world that stands before our own material givenness. (In order to counter the idea that there is a pure, undefiled world out there that is corrupted by the khandha-process, it is important to note that both the world and our experience of it are marked by conditionality from the outset of the khandha-process. That is, my eyes are conditioned by numerous factors [genes, diet, experience or karma] as is the painting with which they come into contact [constructed from parts, creative choices of the artist, intensity of light].)

2. Feeling (vedanā) is the qualitative continuum from the raw, unprocessed feeling that arises when a sense faculty comes into contact with a sense object to the emotional response conditioned by that sensation. For example, when the nose meets a scent, the scent may be experienced in varying registers of pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality; and this experience triggers memories and emotions. It is important to note here that sensation concerns the quality of visceral friction and the feelings conditioned by that friction, and is not a matter of discriminating judgment or opinion.

3. Perception (saññā) is the processing of the object of sense as such and such: the sensation on the ear is “a dog’s bark,” on the skin is “a rain drop,” on the tongue is “a chocolate cookie.” Unformed materiality (vibrating waves hitting the ear, and so on) settles into specific form. Perception, saññā, thus connotes a degree of sharpened focus, of something’s coming into view as a particular kind of object.

4. Conceptual Fabrications (saṅkhāra) arise as the closer discernment concerning the (perceived) qualities of the object. The important point here is that this discernment is, to a great extent, based on personal proclivities, which in turn are products of conditioning (via family, culture, genes, experience). This term is often translated as “volition” since it is understood as an exercise of the will to fashion the perceived object in a particular way. But really the Sanskrit verbal formation from which the Pāli is derived simply denotes “putting together, forming, embellishing.” In the Buddhist view, these terms describe precisely what we do whenever we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, or cognize an object. Namely, we co-construct the object by coloring our perceptions with qualities, judgments, and narratives deriving largely from our side, and not from the side of the object itself. Because we react to the world as it is fashioned by us, rather than to some world “in-itself,” saṅkhāra is an acutely important Buddhist technical term.

5. Cognizance (viññāṇa) can be understood as being simultaneously the mirror and the appearance reflected in the mirror. It is both our objectless awareness, which is standing always already present, on the one hand, and the awareness of the fully formed object (formed, of course, via the previous four khandhas), on the other. I think that viññāṇa functions in both of these senses within the khandha-process. The English term “cognizance” nicely captures this double meaning since it connotes both “awareness itself,” and “thinking about” that which is given in that awareness. So, to give a specific example in terms of the khandha-process: As a sentient being, I am aware. Sound waves hit my ears (rūpa). These waves are experienced as pleasant (vedanā). The perception forms that the waves are birdsong (saññā). As if automatically, particular memories, notions, and interpretations regarding the birdsong proliferate (saṅkhāra). I discursively think about these memories, respond to those memories, then think about those responses, and on and on (viññāṇa). Because of these intentional acts of thinking, viññāṇa is sometimes referred to as “karmic consciousness.” That is, such thinking is itself a conditioned action that gives rise to further mental, verbal, and bodily activity. Finally, it is important to note that cognizance is understood by the Buddha as being manifest through a particular mode of perception — eye-cognizance, ear-cognizance — and not as some kind of pervasive, ghost-like “consciousness.” (It is for this reason that I chose not to render viññāṇa in its usual manner as “consciousness.”)

(b) Now, having gained some theoretical understanding of the khandhas, identify each element in an actual act of each of the six modes of apprehension (seeing, hearing, tasting, bodily feeling, smelling, thinking). Here’s an example. Observe the arising of a sound.

(1)   Note, first of all, the very presence of your ear and of the physical world. What you are noticing is, of course, the givenness of materiality (rūpa).

(2)   Simply and directly notice the next sound that arises. Note the bare sensation (vedanā) engendered by the friction from the interaction of that sound and your ear. Does this contact produce a sensation that is pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral? How does this sensation condition how you feel mentally, physically, emotionally?

(3)   Notice that seemingly simultaneous with contact comes a particular perception (saññā) concerning the nature of the sound object. It is a passing car; it is the chirping of a bird; it is your daughter’s voice; it is someone coughing, and so forth.

(4)  Carefully observe what you did (saṅkhāra) with that perception. Did you start to weave some sort of story concerning the sound? Did you color it with names, views, opinions, value judgments? In short, did you engage, to any degree, in manipulation and contrivance of the sound? Can you, in this manner, discern to what extent you played a role in co-creating the sound?

(5) Notice the reflective, mirror-like quality of simply being aware of sound. (Glass, perhaps, is a more suitable metaphor than a mirror, since glass is both transparent and reflective.) Notice that “within” this spacious awareness a particular object of sound-awareness stands fully formed. Can you just be aware of this entire unfolding. This “just,” you may notice, requires simply leaving “it” alone. (“It” is the raw sound together with your fashioning of the sound. How could you possibly separate each of these out from the another? How can you discern where “you” end and “it” begins?).

(c) Finally, what do you make of the Buddha’s characterization of this entire process? Was (is) what he says here clarified in your own experience?

Form is like a lump of foam,

feeling like a water bubble;

perception is like a mirage,

conceptual fabrications like a plantain tree,*

and cognizance like an illusion.

However one may ponder the self

and carefully investigate it,

it appears hollow and void

when one views it carefully. (Majjhimanikāya 3.22.95.)

*[That is, it consists of endless layers, like an onion, with, finally, no core.]

An abundance of questions might arise out of this exercise. Many of these questions are of a potentially revolutionary and transformative nature because of the real-life consequences they engender. For example, is it necessary to posit a stable, integral self, soul, or identity in order to account for your moment to moment experience?  What might be the source, role, and function of the persistent feeling of “I, me, mine” that runs throughout our experience? Doesn’t this exercise in the khandhas strongly suggest that all that we can honestly claim for moment to moment existence is that there is a continual unfolding of a process, physical and psychological in nature? If so, what challenges does this view (insight?) have for the theistic framework for living held dear, I imagine, by so many readers?

From Glenn Wallis, Basic Teachings of the Buddha (New York: Random House, 2007).

nibbāna: unbinding

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nibbāna. The term nirvāṇa (this is the more common, Sanskrit, spelling) has found its way, via the Beats, the Hippies, grunge, punk, New Age, and Madison Avenue, into everyday English usage. The common, and not incorrect, understanding of nirvāṇa is that it concerns an extinguishing, or blowing out of a flame. This is also how it is routinely rendered in secondary works on Buddhism, as well as in translations of the primary literature. For those readers who have the patience of the slow, and wish to wade through the etymological and philological intricacies of the verbal formation (prefix) nir + (root) , I recommend Steven Collins’ extraordinary Nirvana and other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), particularly pages 191-203.

But “blowing out” may not be the only way of construing the term. There is evidence that from at least the fifth century, Buddhist themselves have understood the term nirvāṇa to suggest an “unbinding.” Many, I suspect most, scholars would reject this understand as being based of “folk” (read “fanciful, hence wrong”) etymology. It is true that in the Indian cultural realm, explanations of word origins can be quite, well, creative. This is not necessarily the bad thing that modern scholars make it out to be. If nothing else, we learn from a tradition’s creative etymologies something about that tradition’s self-understanding.

I am following Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s lead in adopting the unusual term “unbinding” for nirvāṇa; so, I will let him speak for himself in defending this choice. I am quoting him at such length on this matter because I think that his argument is worthy of wider recognition and consideration. His statement here certainly serves as a gentle budge away from what has become yet another axiomatic Buddhist-Hybrid-English (non)translation. And who knows, maybe it will help us to understand what nirvāṇa “is.”

The Buddha’s choice of the word Unbinding (nibbāna)–which literally means the extinguishing of a fire – derives from the way that the physics of fire was viewed at his time. As fire burned, it was seen as clinging to its fuel in a state of entrapment and agitation. When it went out, it let go of its fuel, growing calm and free. Thus, when the Indians of his time saw a fire going out, they did not feel that they were watching extinction. Rather, they were seeing a metaphorical lesson in how freedom could be attained by letting go. (The Wings of Awakening [Barre: Dhamma Dana Publications, 1996], p. 6.)

[Now quoting a canonical passage; the Buddha said,] If a [practitioner] abandons passion for the property of form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . mental processes . . . consciousness, then owing to the abandoning of passion, the support is cut off, and there is no base for consciousness. Consciousness, thus unestablished, not proliferating, not performing any function, is released. Owing to its release, it stands still. Owing to its stillness, it is contented. Owing to its contentment, it is not agitated. Not agitated, [the practitioner] is totally ‘nibbana-ized’ right within. . . ([Samyuttanikāya] 22.53.)

[Thanissaro Bhikkhu again.] This being the set of events–stillness, independence, unattachment– associated with the extinguishing of fire and the attainment of the goal, it would appear that, of all the etymologies offered to explain the word “nibbāna,” the closest one to its original connotation is that quoted by Buddhaghosa in The Path of Purification (8. 247) [a premier authoritative source for the Theravāda; fifth century C.E.]. There, he derives the word from the negative prefix nir plus vāna, or binding: Unbinding.

Modern scholars have tended to scorn this derivation as fanciful, and they favor such hypotheses as “blowing out” [etc.] But although these hypotheses might make sense in terms of modern Western ideas about fire, they are hardly relevant to the way nibbāna is used in the Canon. Freedom, on the other hand is more than relevant. It is central, both in the context of ancient Indian theories of fire, and in the psychological context of attaining the goal: “Not agitated, [the practitioner] is totally unbound right within.” . . . What kind of unbinding? We have already gained some kind of idea—liberation from dependency and limitations, from agitation and death. (The Mind Like Fire Unbound [Barre: Dhamma Dana Publications, 1996], pp. 41-42.)

I am going one small step further than Thanissaro Bhikkhu by writing “unbinding” in place of “Unbinding.” “Unbinding,” with its Germanic upper case, seems too much like a static place or thing, like the Absolute, The Transcendent, the Holy, or God. The lower case version helps to cut through this tendency towards reification, and suggests instead an active process. A process of what? Well, of being able to unbind from the fuel of, say, hostility. The metaphor suggests the simultaneous non-manipulative letting be (of the fuel) and the diminishment of its combustion.

[From Glenn Wallis, The Dhammapada: Verses on the Way (New York: Random House, Modern Library, 2004).]

tanhā: craving

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tanhā. What is the origin of the unease we experience in our lives? The Buddha’s answer is, “the fact that you demand too much from the world.” We ask—entreat, implore, intensely desire— that the world’s objects yield abiding pleasure, satisfaction, and security. But how can they? Their fundamental nature is impermanent, non-substantial, and unreliable. “Asking too much” is an old-fashioned meaning of the verb “to crave” (from Anglo Saxon crafian). The Pāli term behind this translation is tanhā, from Sanskrit tṛṣṇā, meaning “thirst.” So, what is the origin of human unease? It is the perpetual demands that we make on the world, and the parched state of being that arises from an apparently unquenchable thirst for sensory pleasure.

From Glenn Wallis, Basic Teachings of the Buddha (New York: Random House, 2007).

papañca: proliferation

tina modotti reciting a poem

papañca. This term is extremely important for understanding Buddhism; and it is extremely difficult to translate. To give some indication of each of these issues, I ask the reader to consider this translation/gloss by a contemporary Buddhist studies scholar. Bear in mind that this is an excellent translation, particularly in terms of conceptual compactness and precision of meaning, and one that is hard to improve on: papañca is “the psycho-linguistic proliferation of cognitive-conative projections onto experience; or the linguistic ‘excess’ responsible for and resulting from mistaking interpretation for ‘reality.’” (Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology [London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002], p. 55.) As this translations indicates, papañca has the basic meaning of the following notions: manifestation, development, manifoldness, diversity, diffuseness. All of this gives rise to another sense of the term: phenomena, appearance, the visible world, the expansion of the universe. Now, add these to a third sense of the word—deceit, fraud, trick, error, unreality—and the meaning of the term may start to become apparent. First, papañca is something that we do when we begin the very process of thinking and conceptualizing about the world, about things, situations, ideas, hopes, concerns, and so forth. In so doing, we create complication by projecting onto bare phenomena complex interpretations. Second, this interpretation is formed out of our proclivities—it does not arise out of the things, etc. Third, papañca is thus a mechanism of “worlding” (read as a present progressive verb). It is a process whereby a very particular world, my world, arises before me. This world is particular because it is dependent on my specific conceptual, linguistic, psychological, etc., structuring patterns. Fourth, all of this is, according to the Buddha, both personally and socially “besetting.”

Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises [through the eighteen dhātus; see note 146]. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates [= papañca]. With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions [born of] mental proliferation beset a person with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable through the eye [to: mind-objects cognizable through the mind]. (Majjhimanikāya 18.16.)

[The Buddha is asked:] “what gives rise to jealousy and avarice, what is their origin, how are they born, how do they arise? Owing to the presence of what do they arise; owing to the absence of what do they not arise?

[The Buddha responds:] “jealousy and avarice take rise from like and dislike, this is their origin this is how they are born, how they arise. When these are present, they arise. When these are absent, they do not arise.”

[Question:] “But what gives rise to like and dislike . . . [as above]?”

[Answer:] “They arise from desire . . .”

[Question:] “But what gives rise to desire . . .?”

[Answer:] “Desire arises from thinking. When the mind thinks about something, desire arises; when the mind thinks about nothing, desire does not arise.”

[Question:] “But what gives rise to thinking . . .”

[Answer:] “Thinking arises from the tendency to proliferation [= papañca]. When this tendency is present, thinking arises; when it is absent, thinking does not arise.” (Dīghanikāya 21.2.2.)

As the reader might surmise from these passages, an awakened person is defined in part by his or her ending of the process of papañca. An awakened person no longer tells stories about the world, no longer generates complexity, no longer engages in obsessive activity.

Interested readers should see Bhikkhu Nañananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971).

[From Glenn Wallis, The Dhammapada: Verses on the Way (New York: Random House, Modern Library, 2004).]

sabba: the all

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There seems to be no better place to begin than with the word sabba.

Sabba is the Abraham Lincoln of the Pali lexicon. A word could hardly hail from more humble origins or rise to such giddy heights. Sabba is homespun yet eloquent: it speaks the matter-of-fact and it insinuates the sublime. Sabba realized is the Great Emancipator: “Without directly knowing and fully realizing sabba,” says Gotama, “you will not be able to eliminate distress (dukkha) (Saṃyuttanikāya 35.26).

Sabba means “all.” That’s all. It belongs to the lowly class of linguistic laborers known as pronominal adjectives. That is, when it stands in for a noun or a noun phrase (like “it” just substituted for “the word sabba”), it’s working as a pronoun; but, when it further explains, or modifies, a subsequent word (like “subsequent” just did), then it is clocking in as an adjective. All was lost in the flood.

All, alas, is never as simple as it appears, is it? As each of us knows, all is everywhere. All is entire, whole, complete in itself. It is total and, well, all-encompassing. “The whole,” as Aristotle reminds, “is something besides its parts … a unity” (Metaphysics 8.5.1045a). And so we have the Presidential All: the One, the Absolute, the Ever-Present and All-Knowing, the Summum, the Sublime, the Cosmic Father, and the Universal Mother. All, by definition, knows no bounds — particularly when it transmutes into a noun. The German word for “universe” is “das All.”

But Gotama was a farmer, not an astronomer. Although he, too, posited an “all,” what he had in mind was something closer to the earth than dirt. Let’s listen in on Gotama’s succinct teaching on sabba.

I will teach you the all (sabba). Listen to what I say. What is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and scents, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and thoughts. This is called the all. Someone might say, “I reject this all, I will declare another all.” But because that is simply a groundless assertion, such a person, when asked about it, would not be able to explain, and would, moreover, meet with distress. What is the reason for that distress? Because that all is not within his or her sensorium. (Sabba Sutta; Saṃyuttanikāya 4.25.2.)

If we keep in mind that Gotama’s project as a teacher is to show us a way to overcome dukkha, existential unease, then sabba becomes the answer to one of the most crucial questions we can pose ourselves: where do I begin the project of knowing —directly, immediately, for myself — the source of my dissatisfaction? To answer, as Gotama does, “by realizing sabba,” is to claim that the knowledge we require for gaining precious insight into our unhappiness is literally right in front of our noses (and eyes, and ears, and so on); the knowledge we require is, namely, full and present in the very act of perception. In Gotama’s teaching, an act of perception involves (i) the givenness of the world (forms, sounds, scents, etc.), (ii) sensory reception (the eye, the ear, etc.), and (iii) response (passion, craving, grasping/dispassion, equanimity, unbinding, etc.). (For this latter aspect, you can further explore Saṃyuttanikāya 35.26.)  “The all,” sabba, is Gotama’s way of referring to this starkest, barest, most stripped down, calculus of human being: phenomena + reception / response = lived experience.

It is important to make clear that sabba is the sum total of our actual, rather than imagined, fantasized, or otherwise deluded, reality. In this regard, sabba can be understood as Gotama’s periodic table of the elements. In its first instance, something is one of the following: a visible form, a sound, a scent, a taste, a bodily sensation, or a thought. To “declare another all,” like Gotama’s imaginary interlocutor, is to be confused about the basic categories of being.

If we want to engage in the project of overcoming dukkha, then we have to become intimately familiar with, at home in, our sensorium, sabba, the all. Through meditation practice, we become better able to pay attention is to whatever is unfolding there. Attending in this manner, we can become deeply knowledgeable about the quality, processes, and nature of our lived experience moment by moment. So in this view, your experience is your reality. And your experience is your reality. If that experience is pervaded by persistent dissatisfaction and unease, as Gotama predicts it is, don’t you want to know not about big things like “reality” but about the nature of experience?

An insidious idea of reality is that it is something that stands apart from individual — my, your, his, her — experience. But if you ask people about this, they will deny it — just look; isn’t reality out there?! In his teachings on sabba, Gotama assumes a view that is thus counter-intuitive to our commonsensical view. He assumes, namely, that most of us are ignorant of the fact that the perceptual apparatus (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind) is precisely that mechanism whereby the raw material “out there” is cooked up as my, your, his, her experience. This view is easily verifiable. Imagine that you and I are standing next to each other. A scent wafts across my nose, now your nose. I gag and cough; you breathe deeply and sigh in pleasure. Was the scent the same or different? Where was the locus of this difference? In his teaching on sabba,Gotama asks us to consider the possibility that all of our experience is just as in this example.

(First published in Buddhadharma Magazine, Winter 2008.)

about

Someone asked me to write a lexicon of Buddhist terminology. That’s a big job. I thought I’d start with posting terms that I have already discussed elsewhere; then add some new terms; then see what the next step might be.

The blog is called buddhavacana. That means the word/words/discourse/speech/teachings of someone who has woken up to our human situation.

If you have any suggestions for terms you’d like to read about, or perhaps discuss with others over this blog, please don’t hesitate to let me know.

My name is Glenn Wallis. I have a website with additional information and articles.

Peace